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1 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ERNEST H. DEAN, et al.. 
Respondents, 
~vs-
CALVIN L. RAMPTON, et al., 
Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Defendant-Appellants, Calvin L. Rampton, Governor, 
Clyde L. Miller, Secretary of State, and Vernon B. Romney, 
Attorney General, collectively acting in the capacity of the 
Board of Examiners of the State of Utah, and David S. Monson 
as Auditor of the State of Utah, appeal from the decision 
rendered in the District Court of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff-respondent 
for the complaint brought under U.C.A. 63-2-15 as amended* 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Defendants* Motion to Dismiss plaintiff's action for 
declaratory judgment and plaintiff's Motion to obtain 
Case No. wsn 
the Summary Judgment came on regularly before the Law and 
Motion Division of the District Court of Salt Lake County, 
Stats of Utah, the Honorable James S. Sawaya presiding, on 
January 28, 1976* The parties submitted their respective 
motions upon a stipulated statement of facts and submitted 
memoranda in support of their respective motions, and the 
court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. The 
court entered an order consistent with that ruling on 
March 10, 1976. The order of the lower court held in essence 
that the Board of Examiners is without power to examine and 
approve the reimbursement claims for out-of-state travel by 
members of the legislature. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the summary judgment 
decision, and petition the Court to vacate the order granting 
summary judgment. Further, appellants seek dismissal of the 
action consistent with Article VII, Section 13 of the Con-
stitution of the State of Utah; and a ruling declaring U.C.A. 
63-2-15(3) unconstitutional insofar as it purports to exempt 
travel claims of the legislature, legislature committees or 
members and employees of the legislative counsel from examina-
tion and approval by the Board of Examiners of the State of 
Utah. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This statement of facts is based on the factual 
allegations contained in plaintiff's complaint filed in the 
district court; and to which defendants stipulated. 
Plaintiffs in their official capacity as officers or 
members of the state legislature traveled to the City of 
Phildalphia located in the State of Pennsylvania during the 
week of October 6, 1975, where they attended the annual five-
day session of the National Conference of State Legislatures. 
In addition, plaintiff Brockbank, in his official capacity as 
a member of the Legislature also traveled to the City of New 
York located in the State of New York during the week of 
October 19# 1975, where he attended the Fifth Annual Legisla-
tive Conference on Transportation. None of the plaintiffs 
requested nor received prior approval for their travel from 
the Director of Finance nor the Board of Examiners but rather, 
in accordance with practice sanctioned by Sections 63-2-15 
and 36-12-7, Utah Code Annotated 1953, and by the policy state-
ment for out-of-state legislative travel adopted by the Legisla 
tive Management Committee May 7, 1975, attended the conferences 
aforesaid at their own expense with the expectation of re-
imbursement for their actual and necessary expenses. 
Plaintiffs incurred expenses for air-fare, lodging, 
and meals incident to attendance at the national conferences 
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whcih were submitted as actual and necessary expenses by the 
respective plaintiffs to the Department of Finance for approval 
processing, and payment. The Department of Finance after re-
view and processing of the vouchers submitted by the respective 
plaintiffs prepared warrants payable to each of the plaintiffs 
to reimburse them for actual and necessary expenses which were 
submitted to the defendant Monson. 
In accordance with executive practice, the defendant 
Monson submitted the warrants of plaintiffs Dean and Rencher 
on November 6, 1975, and of plaintiff Brockbank on November 20, 
1975, to defendants Rampton, Miller and Romney acting as the 
Board of Examiners for approval. The Board of Examiners re-
fused to approve payment of plaintiffs actual and necessary 
expenses because of their failure to comply with the travel 
expense system promulgated by the Director of Finance pursuant 
to Section 63-2-15, Utah Code Annotated 1953, although said 
section purports to exempt members of the Legislature from its 
requirements, and because of their failure to secure the 
advance approval of the Board of Examiners for their out-of-
state travel. 
Based upon the refusal and failure of the Board of 
Examiners to approve payment of the plaintiffs1 actual and 
necessary travel expenses the defendant Monson has refused and 
continues to refuse to execute the warrants in payment and 
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reimbursement of plaintiffs1 expenses. A case and controversy 
therefore exists between the plaintiffs and the defendants 
as to whether the Constitution of Utah and, more specifically, 
Article VII, Section 13, permits the Board of Examiners to 
review travel expenditures of the Legislature through a system 
of prior travel approval and whether the defendants can deny 
payment of plaintiffs' actual and necessary travel expenses 
because they failed to obtain the prior approval of the Board 
of Examiners for their out-of-state travel. 
POINT I. 
THE BOARD OF EXAMINERS HAS THE SOLE 
POWER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION TO EX-
AMINE ALL CLAIMS AGAINST THE STATE. 
The powers of the Board of Examiners are conferred upon 
it by Section 13, Article VII, of the Utah Constitution, which 
provides: 
"Until otherwise provided by law, the 
Governor; Secretary of State and Attorney 
General shall constitute a Board of State 
Prison Commissioners, which Board shall 
have supervision of all matters connected 
with the State Prison as may be provided by 
law. They shall, also, constitute a Board 
of Examiners, with power to examine all 
claims against the State except salaries or 
compensation of officers fixed by law, and 
perform such other duties as may be pre-
scribed by law; and no claim against the 
State, except for salaries and compensation 
of officers fixed by law, shall be passed 
upon by the Legislature without having been 
considered and acted upon by the said Board 
of Examiners." (emphasis added). 
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This particular section of our Constitution has been 
the subject of interpretation before this Court on numerous 
occasions. In one of the most recent of such cases, Toronto 
v. Clyde, 15 Utah 2d. 403, 393tP.2d 795, 796, the court said 
in reference to this section of the Constitution: 
"The extent of the power conferred upon 
Examiners by the language, "...with power to 
examine all claims against the State...11, has 
been bef6re this court on a number of occasions 
since statehood. In the case of Bateman v. Board 
of Examiners, we gave extensive consideration of 
this problem and reviewed the Utah decisions 
dealing with it. Upon the basis of the constitu-
tional language, its background and history, in-
cluding the decisional law of our state, we con-
cluded that the framers intended to vest in the 
constitutional officers—the governor, the secre-
tary of state and the attorney general, who are 
elected by and are thus directly responsible to 
the people—more than a mere auditing function, 
that is, power to examine into the advisability 
and necessity of any disbursement or proposed 
obligation of the state; and that this has the 
effect of giving Examiners general supervisory 
power over expenditures by the state government." 
(emphasis added.) 
From this language it is clear that the Board of Examiners 
has very broad general supervisory power over all of the expendi-
tures by the state government. The question is, however, does 
this supervision extend to the Legislature as well? 
This Court held in Toronto that statutory provisions 
passed by the Legislature are unconstitutional insofar as they 
conflict with or attempt to limit the provisions of Article 
VII, Section 13. In particular the Toronto case declared 
-6-
provisions of the Finance Act unconstitutional, which vested 
in the Governor and the Director of Finance power of approval 
over certain expenditures. These claims or expenditures, the 
court observed, were properly subject to approval by the Board 
of Examiners. As a result of the Toronto decision, the 
Legislature in 1969 amended Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-2-15 
(concerning regulation of travel expenses) to conform to the 
constitutional provision requiring the Board of Examiners1 
approval of claims against the state. The statute reads in part: 
"63-2-15. Director to regulate travel 
expenses of state officers and employees— 
Approval by board of examiners.—The director 
of finance shall, subject to approval by the 
board of examiners adopt rules and regulations 
covering travel and travel expenses, both as 
to in-state and out-of-state travel, of all 
state officers, employees, and officials, 
justices of the Supreme Court, district judges 
and judges of the juvenile court, and members 
of all state boards, councils, commissions, and 
committees, whether full-time or part-time. 
These rules and regulations shall provide for 
a travel expense system based upon: 
(1) Per diem rates of payment for sub-
sistence expenses subject to modification of 
such rates where justified to meet special 
circumstances encountered in official attend-
ance at conferences, conventions, and other 
official meetings; 
(2) A mileage allowance; and 
(3) Reimbusrement for other travel ex-
penses incurred. No obligation shall be 
incured for travel outside of the state with-
out the advance approval of the board of ex-
aminers through the director of finance. Such 
-7-
approval shall consist of a certification 
as to the availability of funds as well as a 
review of the necessity and desirability of 
such travel. This section shall not apply to 
the legislature, its committ€>es, or any 
member or employee of same." 
The 1969 amendment rewrote this section, inserting the 
requirement that the Board of Examiners approve the Directorfs 
rules and regulations, and substituting the Board for the 
Governor in the case of advance approval of travel outside 
the state. 
While this section purports to exclude the legislature 
and its members from its provisions, the basic question remains 
whether the Legislature can properly enact such a statute under 
the constitution. In an early decision concerning the con-
stitutional provision for the Board of Examiners, the court com-
mented on the provision itself, and explained the resolution 
when a statute conflicts with the constitution. 
"The powers conferred upon the board of 
examiners, with regard to claims against the 
state by the constitutional provision quoted 
above, are general and sweeping. The power 
would include all claims against the state, 
were it not for the exception which excludes 
salaries or compensation of officers fixed 
by law. An exception of this character may 
not be enlarged nor extended by implication. 
An exception which specifies the things that 
are excepted from a general provision 
strengthens the force of the general 
provisions of the law. 2 Lewis1 Sutherland, 
Stat. Const. §494. It is an elementary 
doctrine that, if there are any provisions 
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in a statute which in any way conflict with 
a constitutional provision, the Constitution 
controls. (emphasis added). State ex rel. 
Davis v. Edwards, 33 Utah 243, 93 P. 720, 721. 
This case, and in particular this language, was so per-
suasive that it was quoted in a later Board of Examiner case, 
Uintah State Bank v. Ajax, 77 Utah 455, 297 P. 434. This Court 
has declared Uintah to be the "landmark case" in the line of 
decisions relating to the Board of Examiners. The language 
of the court makes it clear that when a state statute con-
flicts with a provision of the Constitution, the constitutional 
provision must prevail. 
In the landmark Uintah decision, the court explains at 
some length the relative powers of the Legislature to enact 
statutes which would limit or change the powers vested in the 
Board of Examiners by the Constitution. In Uintah, a claim 
was made to the State Auditor, seeking payment, without first 
submitting it to the Board for approval. The claim was not by 
the auditor, but to and through him against the state. The 
court said: 
"If the view is taken that the Legislature 
intended to make this claim payable by the audi-
tor without presentation to the board of examiners 
then the Legislature attempted to do that which 
it had no power or authority to effectuate, 
and on this question the language in the case 
of State ex rel. v. Edwards, supra, is not 
only appropriate, but decisive. The court said: 
-9-
'The attempt by the Legislature to 
require the Auditor to allow a claim which 
by the Constitution must first be approved 
by the board of examiners can avail nothing. 
The Auditor is bound by the constitutional 
provision. The Legislature Is so bound, 
and so are we. The Legislature may make 
certain evidence conclusive with regard 
to a specific matter, but it may not inter-
fere with powers conferred or duties im-
posed by the Constitution.' (emphasis added.) 
(Uintah, Supra at 466-67). See also State vr 
Hallock, 20 Nev. 326, 22 P. 123, 124. 
Significantly, the court stated the Legislature itself 
was limited by the constitutional provision and "had no power 
or authority to effectuate" any change that would by-pass the 
constitutionally mandated Board of Examiner's approval of claims* 
This rationale could conceivably be extended to Section 63-2-
15(3), exempting the Legislature, its committees, or any member 
or employee of same from the Board's approval of out-of-state 
travel. It states: 
"(3) Reimbursement for other travel expenses 
incurred. No obligation shall be incurred for 
travel outside of the state without the advance 
approval of the board of examiners through the 
director of finance. Such approval shall consist 
of a certification as to the availability of funds 
as well as a review of the necessity and desir-
ability of such travel. This section shall not 
apply to the legislature, its committees, or any 
member or employee of same." 
The language in the Uintah case prohibits the Legislature from 
passing such a statutory provision, as it appears to be in 
conflict with Article VII, Section 13, and unconstitutional* 
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In a more recent case, Wood v. Budge, 13 U.2d. 359, 
374 P.2d. 516, the court again reviewed the constitutional 
provision of Article VII, Section 13. In this case the court 
held that although the Board of Examiners' power was extremely 
broad, it was not absolute. The Legislature, the court said, 
had the final word as to approval of claims against the state, 
after the Board of Examiners had reviewed them. 
"The provision of Sec. 13 Art. VII, quoted 
above, that, "...no claim...shall be passed 
upon by the Legislature without having been 
considered and acted upon by the said Board of 
Examiners plainly indicates that the action of 
the Board was not intended to be so final and 
absolute as to preclude other action by the 
Legislature. We can perceive no other meaning 
than that after the Board has performed its 
duty of examining and acting upon such claims, 
the Legislature may then 'pass upon', i.e., 
exercise its judgment, on them and take such 
action as it deems appropriate. Entirely in 
harmony with this conclusion are: our statu-
tory provision that 'any person who is ag-
grieved_by disapproval of such a claim by the 
Board /Examiners/ may appeal therefrom to the 
legislature'; the prior decisions of this 
court that have touched upon the matter; and 
the practice which has been followed since 
statehood." (Budge, supra at 362). 
Thus, the Legislature can act as a quasi appeals board 
from the Board of Examiners in regard to a specific claim, and 
although the court has held that the Legislature cannot directly 
encroach upon the Board of Examiners by enacting statutory 
provisions which conflict with the Board's constitutional powers, 
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the court has acknowledged that the final determination of 
how state funds shall be expended is for the Legislature• This 
is also true with respect to travel expenses of the Legislature 
itself. Thus, even if Section 63-2-15(3) is unconstitutional, 
it will not prevent the Legislature from approving their own 
expenses on appeal or review, but only after first having 
presented them to the Board of Examiners where they will be 
examined and treated in a like manner with the claims of every 
other state official, officer, or employee. 
In Budge, supra, the principle of legislative review 
of Board of Examiners decisions makes the case particularly 
instructive in the set of facts presently before the court. 
The court in that case affirmed an order of the District Court, 
which required the Board of Examiners to execute payment of 
funds the legislature had appropriated to pay claims against 
the state, even though the Board had refused to approve pay-
ment of the claim when they reviewed the claim originally. 
Thus, in explaining the proper procedure of approving and 
settling claims against the State of Utah, the court said: 
"We can perceive no other meaning 
than that after the Board has performed 
its duty of examining and acting upon 
such claims, the Legislautre may then 
'pass upon' i.e., exercise its judg-
ment upon them and take such action 
as it deems appropriate. 
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To decide otherwise would produce 
the illogical result of turning the 
subsequent presentation of claims... 
into an empty gesture whose only 
purpose wDuld be to rubber-stamp the 
action of the Board." Budge, supra at 518. 
It is apparent then from Budge, supra, that the Board's 
exercise of its power to examine claims against the state is 
subject to review by the Legislature, but only after the 
Board has passed on the matter, having exercised its original 
jurisdiction on all claims against the state. 
This stands in resounding contrast to the plaintiff's 
argument on these facts, where the legislature is attempting 
completely to by-pass the Board, and exempt itself from ever 
having the Board examine their claim at all, thereby evading 
any review of its own travel expenses and violating the 
Board's constitutional mandate. Appellants readily concede 
the legislature's right of final review in light of the Budge 
decision, but respondents1 refuse to acknowledge the Board 
of Examiners' constitutional mandate of original jurisdictional 
on all claims against the state. Thus, while Budge is very 
instructive, it must be limited to cases where the Board has 
had an opportunity to examine a claim. It cannot be read to 
mean that travel expenses of the legislature need not be sub-
mitted at all to the Board. 
Thus, no matter what the source of a claim against the 
State, such as one for travel expenses, it must be submitted 
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to the Board for approval. Significantly, the court stated 
in Uintah, supra, the Legislature itself was limited by the 
constitutional provision and "had no power or authority to 
effectuate" any change that would by-pass the constitutionally 
mandated Board of Examiner's approval of claims. This ration-
ale logically extends to the subsequently adopted Section 
63-2-15(3) exempting the Legislature, its committees, or any 
member or employee of same from the Board's approval of out-
of-state travel. 
POINT II 
IT IS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY TO 
ALLOW THE LEGISLATURE TO CIRCUMVENT 
THE BOARD OF EXAMINERS' REVIEW OF 
TRAVEL CLAIMS. 
While at first glance it may seem awkward to construe 
Section 13, Article VII to require the Board to review legisla-
tive travel claims, since in the context of Budge, supra, the 
Legislature has final authority to review and to accept or 
reject such claims against the state, a closer examination of 
the situation reveals true merit in having the Board do exactly 
that. 
Although the Legislature is not likely to question the 
advisability of or reject its own valid travel claims, review 
by the Board of all claims against the state plays the important 
role of a check and balance in the tripartite system of State 
government in Utah. 
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It is important to distinguish the roles of the counter-
vailing theories of government involved in the present con-
troversy. While separation of powers is a well established 
political theory, it is not a doctrine of law. In the State 
of Utah, it only exists to the extent the state constitution 
delineates the tripartite system of government. At the same 
time, any checks and balances that the framers wrote into the 
constitution act as bridges between the separate branches of 
government and in theory perform opposite kinds of functions 
to that of separation of powers. 
To say that one impinges on the other is logically in-
consistent, however, because each only exists to the extent the 
framers of the constitution desired. Therefore, for the legis-
lature to attempt to statutorily remove the check and balance 
imposed by Article VII, Section 13 of the State Constitution 
is not only contradictory to law, but also to the basic theory 
of government established by our constitution. 
A long cherished tradition in our country is that no man 
is above the law. Judges that mete out penalities for infrac-
tions of the law are subject to the very law they administer. 
Likewise, District courts in this state hear and rule on all 
matters that come before them in a manner consistent with their 
best judgmemt and in good faith, even though surely there are 
occasions they believe they will be overruled or reversed on 
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appeal by the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, petitioners in 
our civil courts do not merely by-pass the district court and 
take their claims directly to the Supreme Court. The original 
jurisdiction of the district courts is not by-passed on the 
basis of an facile assumption of what the Supreme Court will 
do on the final review of the claim. 
Similiarly, what the ultimate effect of a Board decision 
on the legislature cannot be predicted with certainity. There-
fore , it might be imputing too much of a self-serving atti-
tude to the legislature to assume that they will simply give 
rubber-stamp approval to any disapproved legislative travel 
requests on appeal from the Board. This is particularly true 
since it must be remembered the legislature is a body consist-
ing of many highly individualized parts. 
Likewise, while it is true that the people are the 
final judges of legislative acts, and acts of legislators, 
this is more ideatistic than practical* The people can only 
act to remove improvident legislators at election time. 
By mandating i:he #oard of Examiners to check all claims 
against the state, as they arise, the people have an immediate 
check on wasteful uses of their tax money, regardless of by 
whom occasioned. 
It is therefore an affront to > the citizens of Utah for 
the members of the legislature to put themselves above the 
-16-
law by attempting to circumvent the constitutional mandate of 
Article VII, Section 13. This they do on the basis of a 
statute, completely contrary to the state constitution. This 
statute purports to make the legislature the sole reviewers 
of their own travel expenses, while the Constitution has ex-
plicitely established the Board of Examiners as the reviewer 
of such claims. 
The legislature, as representatives of the people, act-
ing in good faith, has nothing to fear by having its claims 
examined by the Board just as all other officers and officials 
of the state do. The legislature has no monopoly on represent-
ing the people of the State of Utah as elected officials; the 
Board of Examiners is under a similar obligation to perform 
its duties in good faith. 
POINT III. 
THE CONSTITUTION EXEMPTS ONLY 
"SALARIES AND COMPENSATION OF 
OFFICERS FIXED BY LAW" FROM THE 
REQUIREMENT OF REVIEW OF ALL CLAIMS 
BY THE BOARD OF EXAMINERS. 
Article VII, Section 13 provides for only one exception 
to the review by the Board of Examiners of all claims against 
the state. In Uintah, supra, the Utah Supreme Court clearly 
explained what that exception was: 
"All claims are subject to action 
by the board of examiners, except only 
claims for "salaries and compensation 
of officers fixed by law."(emphasis added). 
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The reason for the exception contained in Article VII, 
Sec. 13# is clear. The Legislature in pursuance of its 
authority has the sole power to appropriate public funds which 
includes the fixing of salaries and compensation of State 
officers by law and it is not for the executive nor the judicia 
to question the wisdom or the amount of such expenditures. 
This exception, however, is quite narrow, and the grant of 
authority given to the Board of Examiners by the Constitution 
to examine all claims against the state must be given broad 
deference. This would, of course, include legislative travel 
claims. 
The question may arise whether the word "compensation" 
in Article VII, Section 13, could be interpreted to mean travel 
expenses, and thus allow such expenses to fall under the only 
exception. It therefore must be noted that the Utah Supreme 
Court interpreted the meaning of that word in yet another of 
these decisions relating to the Board of Examiners. In 
Marioneaux v. Cutler, 32 Utah 475, 91 P* 355, the court held 
that "salary" and "compensation" are treated as synonymous 
and used interchangeably in the Utah Constitution. Clearly 
then, since travel expenses are not part of salary,,they can-
not be considered compensation. Similarly, there are cases 
around the country holding that travel expenses are not 
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"compensation*" Among such cases are the following: Opinion 
of the Justices, 64 A.2d. 204, 95 N.H. 533; Clark v. Board 
of Commissioners of Clark County, 267 N.W. 138, 64 S.D. 417; 
and Swartz v. Kingsbury County, 267 N.W. 140, 64 S.D. 422. 
Thus, there is no excape from the conclusion that a re-
quest for travel expenses by the members of the legislature 
is a claim against the state, that it is not "salary or com-
pensation of officers fixed by law", and thus not coming within 
that single exception, it is a claim that must be submitted to 
the Board of Examiners for its action. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants respectfully urge the court to carefully 
consider the constitutionally imposed obligation of the Board 
of Examiners to examine all claims against the State of Utah. 
It appears that had the framers of the constitution intended 
the legislature to be exempt from such a mandate, they would 
have made the specific exception. Since they did not do so, 
the overwhelming conclusion must be reached that the legisla-* 
tures• attempt to exempt themselves through U.C.A. 6-2-15(3) 
must be considered unconstitutional and therefore null and void. 
Defendants1 likewise submit that such review of legisla-
tive travel claims by the Board does not constitute any en-
croachment upon the constitutional powers of the legislative 
branch of government. Rather, the review simply performs the 
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healthy function of a check and balance in our tripartite 
system of state government. Separation of powers will thus 
be maintained in precisely the same measure as was ordained 
by the authors of the state's fundamental law. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
PAUL M. TINKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
Delivered a copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant 
to Melvin E. Leslie, George M. Mecham, and Gary E. Atkin, 
attorneys for plaintiff, Room 403# State Capitol, this /x 
day of May, 1976. \o 
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